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Abstract
This paper asks why the EU member states were able to agree on a single market for pension funds in
2003 whereas they had failed to do so in several previous attempts (1991-2002). The main argument is
that the single pension market was a desirable project before 2003, but bargaining ine±ciencies prevented
its realization. This is because bargaining over integration in this sector requires credible signaling be-
tween the political actors in the member states. More speci¯cally, the coordination of divergent welfare
and ¯nancial regimes depends on the ability of governments to send costly signals that only a limited
range of outcomes are considered legitimate solutions at home. In turn, the capacity to signal and the
costs of blu±ng hinge on international pressure for pension reform (European Monetary Union) and the
magnitude of changes governments have to make to their respective welfare-¯nance arrangements. The
di±culty of reaching consensus on this EU directive was signi¯cant and the level of integration accom-
plished varies across issue areas. The knowledge of how it was done may shed light on the mechanisms
supporting or inhibiting the coordination of divergent regulatory regimes more generally.
11 Introduction
Although European regulations increasingly in°uence national welfare and ¯nancial systems, the existing lit-
erature is only beginning to examine how EU decisions are a®ected by, and impact on, national institutional
frameworks in the member states (Schmidt 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Ferrera 2005; Callaghan and
HÄ opner 2005; Menz 2005; Perez and Westrup 2006). Is the creeping Europeanization of social and economic
policies complementary or disruptive to national welfare states? How does the clash of Anglo-Saxon vs.
social corporatist capitalism systems play out at the European level?1 This paper attempts to shed light
on these questions by analyzing feedback e®ects between national occupational pension regimes and recent
pension policies the European Union has mandated. More speci¯cally, it asks why the member states were
able to agree on a European pension fund directive in 20032 whereas they had failed to do so in several
previous attempts (1991-2002).
Occupational pension regimes in Europe have not been su±ciently explored by the existing literature, not
least because of the limited comparability of occupational pension schemes across countries.3 Yet, due to
unfavorable demographic developments, stretched budgets, and swelling non-wage labor costs it is impossible
to deny the growing importance of employer sponsored pensions. Given that cutbacks of social security pen-
sions tend to be politically toxic, governments in most European nations feel mounting pressure to improve
access to second pillar pensions.
Another reason why occupational pensions increasingly move into the limelight is the mounting legislative
activity by the European Union in this policy area, which may or may not be a good ¯t with national in-
stitutional settings (Scharpf 1999). Any transnational regulatory framework governing pension funds across
borders requires a minimum harmonization of investment, social, and supervisory regulations. These, in
turn, have a major domestic impact on economic interactions between governments, occupational pension
plan sponsors, and bene¯ciaries (Bodie and Mitchell 1996; Davis 1999; Eij±nger and De Haan 2000; Ebbing-
haus and Manow 2001; Estevez-Abe 2002).
At the national level, the political will to increase access to second pillar pensions is not in short supply.
But because occupational pension regimes in Europe di®er considerably in terms of regulatory supervision,
¯nancial design, and biometric risk coverage, European harmonization e®orts represent a classic cooperation
problem: converging on EU-wide rules is desirable in principle, but deep divisions exist over both objective
2and means of harmonization. While the liberal bias of EU pension policies may ¯t well with institutions in
countries featuring a mature pension fund culture, it is in many ways opposed to the institutional settings
found in countries with an insurance culture. This makes any common policy hard to adopt. Thus, what ex-
plains the discrepancy between bargaining breakdown in 1991, when pension market integration was initially
proposed, and negotiation success in 2003, when the pension fund directive was adopted? Were skeptical
member states coerced, persuaded, bought o®, or did they simply change their preferences?
We approach this question by developing an analytical framework that captures the interaction of govern-
ments and national varieties of capitalism to explain the shift from negotiation failure to a politically e±cient
agreement. The main argument proceeds as follows. Based on their peculiar systems of social protection,
the European member states may be analytically divided into two opposite camps: pension fund cultures,
found mostly in liberal market economies (LMEs); and insurance based cultures, which are more common
in coordinated market economies (CMEs).4 Given their di®erent institutional structures, any European
framework governing pension portability across borders would in°ict more adjustment costs on conservative
states. These may be further divided into a \high cost" and a \low cost" type, accounting for variation
in the ability to adjust to EU pension policies across conservative types. Governments have private infor-
mation regarding their true cost type. Although the liberal states faced less adjustment costs and actively
supported a European agreement, they were not willing to sign a directive at all costs. Their preference
over an agreement is contingent upon their belief about the type of conservative government they are ne-
gotiating with. While the liberal states preferred to strike a deal with a low cost type, they were willing
to accept a less favorable agreement when facing the high cost type. In 1991, uncertainty about each oth-
ers' beliefs and concomitant inability to distinguish between the two types resulted in bargaining breakdown.
The move to European Monetary Union (EMU), however, changed the cost parameters the conservative
states attached to creating the single pension market. In this environment, failure to agree on integration
threatened to cause further political and economic problems. Thus, the conservative states were able to
send a costly signal, inducing their liberal counterparts to update their belief about which type they were
dealing with. As a result, the member states managed to adopt a politically e±cient { albeit economically
incomplete { pension fund directive in June 2003, four years after the ¯nal stage of EMU had begun. The
null hypothesis is that the conservative countries were never of the high cost, but of the low cost type. Thus,
an empirical test showing that the conservative states were blu±ng and could have implemented an EU
3agreement with only marginal costs would undermine the argument advanced in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section will review existing approaches that
have been applied to decision making in the European Union. The third part analyzes why conservative
governments faced higher costs of bargaining breakdown after EMU was implemented. In the fourth section,
the basic problem of pension market integration is captured by a dynamic game of incomplete information.
The ¯fth part builds an account of the preferences of governments and pension institutions, relying on in-
sights available from the varieties of capitalism approach. The ¯nal section concludes with a summary of
the main ¯ndings and suggestions for future research.
2 Decision-making in the European Union: bargaining and pro-
cedural approaches
In the majority of formal decision-making models, the reasons for and implications of negotiation breakdown
are rarely explored. Proponents of procedural approaches, for example, have modeled the formal legal se-
quencing of the various EU decision making processes. Their goal is to assess whether agenda-setting, veto or
gate keeping rights empower an institutional actor, such as the European Parliament or the EU Commission
(Tsebelis 1996; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel 2002; Majone 1994; Sbragia 2002).
The hidden assumption in those studies is that informal deliberations are unimportant compared to legal
procedures. While not every legal rule is unequivocal, the clarity and traceability of legal procedures com-
pares favorably to the obscure informality of pre-decision consultations. However, the outcomes of speci¯c
European decision processes are not only a®ected by formal institutional rules, but also by a variety of in-
teracting factors, such as cognitive and normative orientations, which de¯ne the \game" that is being played
(Blyth 2003; Hall 1993; McNamara 1998; Risse 2001; Sabatier 1998; Schmidt 2000).
While procedures set the boundaries within which action takes place, they do not determine behavior. Sev-
eral studies have shown that deliberations prior to the legal steps of adopting rules is critical to political
outcomes in the European Union, just as they are in every democratic decision making body around the
world (Wallace 2000; Achen 2006, p. 124). These works demonstrate that the deliberations preceding the
4formal decision making process are more consequential than the narrow legalities. My aim is in no way to
diminish the importance of procedures and votes for policy outcomes or the contributions of such work to
our understanding of how certain decisions come about. After all, any European directive, law, and regu-
lation is shaped by the need to have it rati¯ed at the legal decision making stage. But an exclusive focus
on legalities cannot explain why governments sometimes fail to reach an agreement despite tangible bene¯ts
from cooperation. European Commissioners test the waters to gauge which proposals may have a chance of
getting formally adopted. As Achen (2006) aptly points out, \[T]hey do not vote on various proposals until
one alternative wends its way through a set of legal procedures and emerges as law. Instead, it is the prior
exploration of feasible outcomes, bargaining, and political power that dominate" (Achen 2006, p. 126).
Thus, understanding the nature of decision making in the EU requires analysis of why informal negotiations
sometimes result in deadlock, and sometimes in politically successful agreements. Although bargaining ap-
proaches have been successfully applied to address this question (Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita 2004; Thomson 2006), they are unsatisfactory for studying feedback e®ects between the
international and domestic levels. As historical institutionalists have pointed out, domestic political parties,
coalitions, and other modes of interest representation tend to be rather sticky. Therefore, we not only need
to explore when and why politicians attempt to shift established policy patterns by brokering agreements at
the European level, but also how EU directives might feed back on national elites and the public to sharpen
certain cleavages and sti°e others.
We argue that a domestic constraints model, framed as a signaling game, is better suited for capturing the
dynamics underlying the deliberations to the single pension market than standard procedural or bargaining
approaches, because the actor-centered perspective allows us to understand more precisely how EU integra-
tion is linked to domestic politics. Modeling contestation over the pension fund directive as a signaling game
between European governments demonstrates how political success in one area of integration gives rise to
success in another area. In contrast to simplistic \spill-over" arguments that are impossible to falsify (Haas
1958), we o®er a testable argument about how functional necessities arising from integration in a particular
policy ¯eld (European Monetary Union) in°uence negotiation processes in another policy area (pension mar-
ket integration). In this respect, our theory is consistent with liberal institutionalist approaches (Keohane
1984; Keohane 1989), but it departs from these works by including an explanation of the concrete delibera-
tions that are informed by domestic preferences (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004; Moravcsik 1998). The
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3 Contestation over pension market integration: liberal pension
fund cultures versus conservative insurance cultures
At ¯rst glance, the governance of pension funds across borders may seem like a simple target for EU har-
monization e®orts. The potential bene¯ts seem sizeable: more integrated capital markets, lower barriers
to labor mobility, and substantial savings in administrative costs for multinational businesses. However, a
single European pension market required institutional changes that re°ected the fact that cooperation was
desired in issues over which preferences varied. Based on the insights of Thomas Schelling (1960) and Robert
Putnam (1988), we hypothesize that the relative weight each government assigned to the costs and bene¯ts
of a single pensions market determined its \bargaining type" at the European negotiation table.
Governments can be of two kinds: those representing an insurance culture (i.e. Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and those representing a pension fund culture (i.e. Denmark, Britain,
Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands). A European{wide framework for pension portability a®ects the two
types di®erently because of their distinctive welfare-capitalism arrangements. We label the ¯rst type \con-
servative", because the regulatory regimes found in this group are more likely to face high costs of reform.
Mature pension fund cultures, by contrast, ¯t better with EU pension policies and are therefore less likely
to endure high adjustment costs. This latter group is referred to as \liberal" states.
Because the conservative states harbored occupational pension sponsors and bene¯ciaries most likely to su®er
from integration, they found the creation of a European single pensions market politically more costly than
the liberal countries. Pension funds in these countries are typically subject to heavy regulatory restrictions
and investment limits, making it di±cult for the pensions industry to attract the pension management skills it
needs to be competitive (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Deutsch 2002).
Most pension schemes o®er biometric risk coverage, which denotes relatively expensive social protection
against disability, survivor dependence, and longevity. More importantly, many employers in conservative
states o®er corporate pensions that only exist on the books and are not funded.5 The method of internal
¯nancing is preferred by many employers because deferred taxation rules make these assets available for
6¯nancing current business activities (Ahrend 1996; Manow 2001; Schoden 2003). Furthermore, long waiting
and vesting periods6 attached to book reserve pensions commit workers to the ¯rm for a long period of time
and therefore discourage poaching. As such, such pensions provide ¯rms with an e®ective sta® retention
device. Any move towards an EU-regulated single pensions market posed a threat to this cheap source of
capital, because the liberal states intended to introduce funding requirements for all pension schemes (in-
cluding book reserve pensions). This is because funding is commonly thought of as vital for safeguarding
corporate pension entitlements.7
However, there is variation in adjustment costs across conservative member states. Di®erences in institu-
tional structures, such as the size of the service sector (Iversen and Wren 1998), the extent of public sector
employment (Martin and Thelen 2007), state capacity to \impose" unpopular reform packages on social part-
ners (Hassel and Ebbinghaus 2000; van Wijnbergen 2002), as well as past experiences with welfare spending
on di®erent age groups (Lynch 2006) all in°uence the precise costs of reform. While some states have suc-
cessfully incurred short-term costs to introduce funded components to their pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension
systems, other governments may have refrained from doing so in order to establish, or maintain, a reputation
as the guardian of the welfare state. Because the costliness of adjusting domestic pension systems to EU
mandated regulations is not directly observable from outside, governments have an informational advantage
concerning their true cost types. This is particularly true for a government's readiness to honor or default on
debt obligations, of which pension liabilities constitute the largest part. Although European-level negotiators
meet in a variety of formal and informal settings and swap information about each other, they may have an
incentive not to disclose their information fully or accurately. Furthermore, if there is no underlying consen-
sus on the goals and design of the single pension market, member state representatives might disagree on the
best alternative despite all of the relevant information being shared. Such systemic biases may induce nego-
tiators not to fully disclose the severity of constraints they face at home (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006,
p. 209). We therefore presume that the true cost of reform is private information of individual member states.
In contrast to their conservative counterparts, liberal governments faced lower costs of reform. This is be-
cause their countries feature comparatively mature corporate pension systems,an internationally competitive
pensions industry, skilled asset-liability managers, and relatively liberal investment regulations.8 Occupa-
tional pension schemes rarely o®er expensive biometric risk coverage (Blake 2003; BÄ orsch-Supan and Miegel
2001; Daykin 1996; Davis 2000; Lynes 1997). While in conservative countries the top political priority
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monetary interests dominating (Whiteside 2006, p. 44). Even though the private information assumption
regarding the true costs of reform also holds for the liberal states, the congruence between European pension
market integration and the mature pension fund cultures these governments represent attenuates di®erences
in adjustment costs. Because variation in the bene¯ts the liberal types secure from integration is su±ciently
small, it is innocuous to assume a single type set for the liberal states.
Given the di®erent pension cultures these governments represent, they envisaged radically di®erent versions
of a European-wide framework. While the liberal states preferred to implement the single pensions mar-
ket based on high harmonization of investment regulations (the application of the so-called prudent man
rule), high harmonization of funding requirements, and no harmonization of biometric risk coverage, their
conservative counterparts envisioned the polar opposite: maintenance of quantitative investment limits, no
harmonization of funding requirements, and high harmonization of biometric risk coverage. In short, the
two types had di®erent political ideal points corresponding to divergent levels of integration.
However, the literature underscoring the signi¯cance of constrained domestic win-sets for international bar-
gaining leverage (Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993) is unsatisfactory for
explaining the discrepancy between negotiation failure in 1991 and negotiation success in 2003. This body of
research would have predicted a policy outcome more favorable to the ideal points of the conservative states
because the high costs of reform should have translated into a bargaining advantage. But this is contradicted
by empirical evidence. The Commission's initiative in 1991 to tackle the restrictions inhibiting cross-border
pension portability9 hit a brick wall of opposition from almost all EU countries (Deutsch 2002; Karas 2003;
Observatoire des Retraites 1999; Rupprecht 2001).
Sir Leon Brittan, Commissioner for competition policy and ¯nancial services, ¯rst presented his vision for
pension market integration in 1991, after it emerged that pension funds had been forgotten in Jacques Delors'
White Paper (1985) on the single market. To create pan-European pension funds, Brittan proposed reforms
in three critical areas: freedom of investment, freedom of management, and cross-border membership (EFRP
2001, p. 45). The member states' response to pension market integration was overwhelmingly negative. The
conservative member states not only opposed all of Brittan's suggestions, but even tried to turn the draft
proposal on its head. Although the Commission's goal was to liberalize freedom of capital across borders,
8the conservative states attempted to use the directive proposal to enshrine tough investment regulations,
which ultimately made it unattractive to the countries that had sought its adoption, in particular Britain,
the Netherlands, and Ireland (Interview with Commission administrator, 23 June 2006).
Although investment restrictions were frequently justi¯ed with the need to protect investors against market
risk, a more important reason for opposing the delegation of control over investment regulations to Brussels
was the Commission's plan to include unfunded book reserve pensions under the scope of the directive.
As previously mentioned, employers in conservative countries cherish book reserve pensions because they
provide them with cheap company ¯nance and an e®ective sta® retention device (Estevez-Abe 2002; Hen-
nessy 2007). EU-mandated investment and social regulations, however, would have forced ¯rms to fund
these pensions, thereby obliterating the long-term nature of capital °ows and labor relations. Because the
conservative governments realized that adoption of such sweeping regulatory changes was politically dan-
gerous, they o®ered to create a single pension market that corresponded more closely to their own national
institutional frameworks.10
Yet, despite ostensibly legitimate concerns over the impact of the directive on domestic employers, this
countero®er was quickly dismissed by the liberal member states. The reason is that the countero®er was
not interpreted as a costly signal and therefore eroded the credibility of the domestic constraints argument.
Given that population aging and concomitant reform pressures weighed more heavily on PAYG pension
systems than on mature pension fund cultures, the liberal states adopted a wait and see attitude, refusing to
make any concessions to their conservative counterparts. As the Irish Association of Pension Funds remarked
at the time, \The Irish, British and Dutch pension systems are far more developed than those existing in
other EU countries and it is imperative that they be protected. It is better to have no directive than a bad
directive."11 As a result of this deadlock, the Commission withdrew its proposal. Subsequent attempts to
come to an agreement were made in 1993 and again in 1999 when the original draft was amended, but these
also failed and were eventually shelved when the Commission resigned in the wake of massive scandals in 1999.
This episode demonstrates that, contrary to what the \constrained win set" literature would predict, each
camp { insurance versus pension fund countries { declined to reform its own welfare-¯nance arrangements
and instead urged the other side to adjust. Neither side was able to translate the domestic constraint logic
into a bargaining advantage. Thus, what we seek to contribute to this debate is an argument about the
9conditions that make the \constrained win-set"-strategy a credible choice of governments.
As many scholars have demonstrated (Schneider and Cederman 1994; BrÄ auninger, Cornelius, KÄ onig, and
Schuster 2001; Hug and KÄ onig 2002), it makes a di®erence whether domestic constraints are perceived as
real or feigned. In 1991, failure to distinguish between cheap talk and credible signals contributed to the
breakdown of negotiations over the pension fund directive. Since both liberal and conservative states had
the same preferences { designing the single pensions market without reforming their own social and eco-
nomic institutions { their signals could not be informative. Conservative governments did not have to fear
immediate audience costs (Fearon 1995) resulting from negotiation breakdown, such as electoral punishment
or loss of reputation. This is why each player tried to hold out for a better deal, and negotiations resembled
a \war of attrition".
In 2003, however, the single pension market was part of an overarching project { European Monetary Union
{ and several steps towards further ¯nancial market integration had already been taken. These measures
include banking and stock-market regulation, as well as permission for banks, insurance and investment
companies to operate EU-wide with a single license. Realizing their competitive disadvantage vis--vis insur-
ance companies, pension funds, represented by the European Federation for Retirement Provision (EFRP),
began to lobby for their own \single passport" (EFRP 2001). Thus, European pension policies are not the
deliberate result of attempts to over-regulate the economy or to build a \social Europe", but the unintended
consequence of policies aimed at solving problems stemming from internal market integration.
We hypothesize that, once European Monetary Union was implemented, the economic and political costs of
bargaining breakdown became much higher for governments retaining large unfunded pension obligations.
This does not mean that the costs of complying with any European framework had diminished. While con-
servative governments still faced high economic costs of implementing the European pension fund directive,
the political costs of bargaining failure, however, had become even higher. This is because failure to establish
the single pension market threatened to do three things: 1) decrease sovereign credit ratings due to higher
interest rates on government debt, 2) diminish the legitimacy of cutting back on social security pensions at
home, and 3) confront governments with a highly unfavorable set of intertemporal policy choices. While the
¯rst point represents the source of higher economic costs, the second and third aspect embody the increased
political costs associated with failure to reach agreement on the pension fund directive. Let us consider each
10in turn.
First, EMU changed the level of conservative governments' implicit and explicit debt obligations and as such,
may impact on the perception of their solvency (Fiess 2003, p. 4). By creating the European Central Bank,
national governments lost the option of expanding the money supply to meet debt obligations, of which
unfunded pension liabilities are the largest part (Eij±nger and De Haan 2000). Thus, an important e®ect of
the single currency may be a shift of attention on the credit quality of European governments as if they were
private sector companies. As Hamilton and Flavin (1986) show, intertemporal budget constraint models play
an important role in assessing public sector solvency. Prior to EMU, the large credit rating agencies focused
on the debt obligations of national governments according to a complex set of quantitative and qualitative
criteria, such as political risks, ¯scal °exibility, monetary stability, external liquidity, economic structure,
and the like (Hamilton and Flavin 1986).
After the implementation of EMU, however, rating agencies have proposed to use new criteria, similar to
the ones applied to large corporations (Financial Times 1991). Several studies (Daley 1984; Feldstein and
Seligman 1981; Carroll and Niehaus 1998) have found that rating agencies do take unfunded pension liabil-
ities of corporations into account when determining a ¯rm's risk pro¯le. According to this perspective, an
underfunded pension plan represents a claim against future cash °ows which decreases the security of other
debtholders' claims, all else equal. Other scholars (Truglia 2002) argue that unfunded pension claims of gov-
ernments play only a minor role in assessing sovereign credit risk. Although calculations of future pension
liabilities provide a projection of a given scenario, Truglia does not expect this projection to actually mate-
rialize: \As a result (...) large future pension claims have not greatly in°uenced our ratings of government
debt in the industrialized world, even where net present value calculations would indicate very substantial
claims on government resources over a 20-30 year time horizon. We simply expect that the government will
`default' in the future on its pension promises as currently written in law in a way that will favor creditors"
(Truglia 2002, p. 2{3).
This expectation implies, however, that the ratings of the a®ected countries could come under severe pressure
unless appropriate reform steps are introduced. Lower ratings indicate a decrease in a country's readiness
and willingness to meet debt obligations duly and may therefore deter potential investors. This, in turn,
may decrease the number of investment funds which will buy government bonds, and increase the interest
11rate on government debt. While some insurance based countries such as Germany, Austria, and France
consistently received the highest scores, rating agencies strongly emphasize the need for structural reform.
Standard and Poor's country report in 2002 mentioned that \[t]he ratings on Germany will be supported by a
consistent long-term approach in addressing the challenges of eliminating structural budget de¯cits, increas-
ing employment growth, and putting the increasingly overburdened health and pension systems on a more
solid footing" (Standard and Poor's 2002). Other conservative states such as Belgium, Italy, and Portugal
are rated lower.12 The decisions of rating agencies also a®ect the borrowing costs for individual compa-
nies. For example, in February 2003 the German steel and engineering ¯rm ThyssenKrupp was downgraded
two weeks after Standard and Poor's expressed concern about ThyssenKrupp's unfunded pension liabilities.13
The increased costliness of negotiation failure in an EMU setting is furthermore connected to domestic per-
ceptions of distributional and generational justice. Failure to strengthen pension portability at the European
level imperiled the legitimacy of cutting back on social security pensions at home. As pension scholars never
tire to point out, the trickiest question associated with reforming PAYG pension systems is how to avoid
punishing one generation by requiring them to ¯nance their parents' pensions and save for their own (Myles
and Pierson 2001). Because young and highly educated employees are more likely to be mobile, they are more
likely to bene¯t from a single pension market than elderly employees with obsolete or ¯rm speci¯c skills. This
is because the prospect of owning occupational pension rights even in case of career changes or interruptions
could be sold to domestic voters as a form of compensation: cuts in future social security pensions would
be o®set by better access to, and more e±cient management of, existing occupational pension rights. Given
that more than 60 percent of young Europeans consider the possibility of being able to work anywhere in
the European Union as an important right (Eurobarometer 1997, p. 113), this outlook is no small enticement.
Thirdly, and most importantly, all EMU countries are signatories to the Growth and Stability Pact, which
limits the build up of public sector de¯cits over time. Because governments face restrictions on the size
of budget de¯cits and the overall build-up of public sector debt, their freedom of ¯scal steering to o®set
these constraints is quite limited (Soskice and Iversen 1998). As a result, reforming pension schemes in the
European Union has become even more urgent, especially in the member states with large PAYG pension
systems (Eij±nger and De Haan 2000). This changed macroeconomic framework has altered the intertempo-
ral policy choice set governments are subject to. Without the Growth and Stability Pact, governments had
incentives to put o® reforming their pension system into the future. Why incur costs in the present when the
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Stability Pact altered political incumbents' time horizon: the longer European governments failed to reduce
their future PAYG pension claims, the tougher the actual cuts required to live within the con¯nes of the
stability pact would have to be. Therefore, the longer the delay, the higher the likelihood that governments
would need to cut entitlements of current bene¯ciaries (Truglia 2002, p. 4). The closer to the present the
actual cuts in bene¯ts are, the greater the risk that governments will su®er electoral punishment. In this
respect, EMU-induced pressure may be seen as a way of overcoming the time inconsistency-problem political
incumbents invariably confront, namely incurring costs in the present to realize a collective good { in this
case, a reduced social security de¯cit { in the future (Pierson 1994; Jacobs 2004).
For these reasons, it was perhaps not overly surprising that it was the Spanish and Italian presidencies of
the EU { two conservative states { to press forward with the pension fund directive. In 1993, newspapers
had warned that \if agreement on the directive is not reached by the end of the Belgian presidency (31
December 1993), the next ¯ve presidencies { Greece, Germany, France, Spain and Italy { are unlikely to
give this particular piece of EU legislation any priority, because these countries do not at present have large
and active private pensions industries" (European Savings Markets, October 21, 1993).14 Yet, as the above
discussion suggests, EMU substantially increased the political and economic costs of failing to realize the
single pension market. As a result, signals by the conservative states that some accommodation at the EU
level was necessary to ease the pain of domestic reforms were costly and hence credible. This prompted the
liberal states to adopt an honest, accommodative position. The following section develops a formal model
that captures the capacity of the European member states to send and receive signals, accounting for the
discrepancy between bargaining ine±ciencies in 1991 and informative exchanges in 2003.
4 Formal model
Consider a simple game of incomplete information played between a single conservative state C representing
the insurance cultures and a single liberal state L representing the pension fund cultures in the European
Union.15 Both are concerned with the extent to which they have to reform their own social and economic
institutions following any agreement at the EU level. They bargain over a convex policy space de¯ned by
the closed interval [0, 1]. C's ideal point lies at 0 and L's ideal point lies at 1. The players are assumed to
13have single peaked preferences. The utility functions are monotonically decreasing when moving away from
their respective ideal points.
The player with private information (C) can be of the high cost type (CH) or of the low cost type (CL). The
two types di®er with respect to their utility for an EU agreement, with the high cost type incurring more
adjustment costs resulting from integration. Only C knows his true cost type, whereas L needs to make
inferences about C based on C's actions.
4.1 Sequence of moves
As illustrated in the game tree, nature moves ¯rst and determines whether conservative state C is of the
high cost or low cost type.
NATURE
INTEGRATIONlow INTEGRATIONhigh BREAKDOWNlow BREAKDOWNhigh
L L
C C
low high
accept accept reject reject
offer offer
(outcome in 1991) (outcome in 2003)
The conservative state moves next and o®ers a level of integration x, with x 2 [0;1]. The game is interesting
because the liberal state does not know which type of C it is negotiating with. L prefers to deal with a low
cost conservative state to implement a single pension market that mirrors its own market-based social and
economic institutions, but if L believes with certainty that C is of the high cost type, L prefers to move
further away from its ideal point to accommodate C. This means L accepts a less favorable point in the
policy space to avoid the worst possible outcome (no integration, or maintenance of status quo). However,
14L has a prior expectation q 2 [0;1] about the distribution of types. Depending on the observed o®er by C,
the liberal state L updates his belief about C. The updated belief ¹ denotes the probability L attaches to C
being of the low cost type. L takes the next step and decides whether to accept or reject C's proposed point
in the policy space. If L accepts, the game ends, and the payo®s resulting from an agreement are distributed.
If L rejects, the negotiations collapse and the players receive the status quo utility minus a penalty, if any,
for bargaining failure. The payo®s for INTEGRATION and bargaining BREAKDOWN are determined by
the costs involved in implementing any negotiated agreement. They are as follows:
BREAKDOWN
U(CH) = U(CL) = 0;
U(LjH) = 0;
U(LjC) = ¡k:
INTEGRATION
U(CH) = ¡rLx + IC;
U(CL) = ¡rHx + IC;
U(L) = ¡s(1 ¡ x) + IL;
where rL < rh and rL = 1, s = 1, IC;IL 2 (0;1), and x 2 [0;1].
Notation: rL and rH denote the costs of reform C incurs to reach an agreement with L (rL normalized to 1);
[0;1] is the policy space both parties bargain over; IC and IL signify the respective bene¯ts the conservative
and liberal states derive from integration; and s represents L's cost of accepting C's o®er (normalized to 1).
4.2 Equilibria
Recall that information about the true cost type is private information of the conservative government. This
means the liberal state's decision about whether to accept or reject C's integration o®er is shaped by its
evolving assessment of C's true cost type. The appropriate solution concept in this game of incomplete infor-
mation is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).16 Note that no separating equilibrium exists. In other words,
the liberal government knows that a low cost government always proposes a point in the policy space that is
more favorable to L and a high cost government always proposes a point less favorable to L. Such a course
15of action is not consistent with the incentives of a low cost conservative government, which always prefers to
pretend to be of the high cost type in the ¯rst phase, inducing its preferred outcome, \low level of integration".
An interesting equilibrium of the game is semi-pooling, in which both BREAKDOWN and INTEGRATION
can occur. Consider the ¯rst case: If L observes a low integration o®er it might mistake a high cost con-
servative government for a low cost government that is blu±ng to get a more favorable deal. Although the
liberal state knows it might be making this mistake, the probability of dealing with a low cost C conveying
cheap talk may be perceived to be su±ciently high that the liberal state prefers to take its chances, reject
the o®er, and ¯nd out C's true cost type. Under this outcome, L randomly challenges C, because claims
about domestic constraints are cheap and thus cannot be informative. Since in this case L is trying to catch
cheaters, bargaining breaks down.
In the second scenario, the outcome is INTEGRATION, because the liberal state received a costly and
therefore credible signal, enabling it to distinguish cheap talk from genuinely high costs of reform. This
induces L to update its belief about C and accept a lower integration o®er to avoid perpetuation of the
status quo, a worse outcome for L. The key to a separating equilibrium is that L wants to get it right and
make the correct inference about C. Mistakes occur when the negotiators choose an outcome that would
not have been chosen had all private information been revealed prior to the vote (Austen-Smith and Banks
1996; Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006).
Although the liberal state prefers to deal with a low cost C to realize a European framework that is closer to
its own ideal point, it clearly wants to avoid negotiation breakdown with a high cost type C. This is because
bargaining collapse with a high cost conservative state would signify a big victory for all risk-averse groups
in conservative states who are anxious to preserve the status quo, such as employers sponsoring book reserve
pensions, risk-averse bene¯ciaries, or pension funds fearing foreign competition. It would make L look like
a loser and considerably diminish the prospect of reaching an agreement in the future. Thus, if L knows for
sure it is dealing with a high cost C, it will always prefer to accommodate C and move further away from its
ideal point to avoid bargaining breakdown, a worse outcome for L. Yet, as the above discussion has shown,
errors can be made when member states' signals are costless.
165 Domestic preferences over the 2003 pension fund directive: Ger-
many and Britain
The previous section analyzed the conditions under which bargaining may break down or lead to a politically
successful agreement. The following part will examine the sources of domestic political and economic actors'
preferences over a single market for pension funds. Examining actors' policy positions is crucial, because
domestic contestation over social and ¯nancial regulations is part of the signal states send and receive at the
European level.
Since a study of domestic actors in all European member states would go beyond the scope of this paper,
the following section will take a closer look at Germany and Britain. The reason for this selection is that
the former represents the prototype of an insurance-based country, the latter the prototype of a pension
fund country. We also exploit the fact that European member states belonging to an insurance culture
tended to side with the claims articulated by Germany, while member states with a pension fund culture
were more likely to support the British position.17 Both states are also central to the literature on \varieties
of capitalism" (VOC) (Aoki 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2001; Coates 2005) and \social
systems of production" (Granovetter 1985; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Streeck 1992).
Through the lens of this research, Germany embodies a coordinated market economy, while Britain exem-
pli¯es a liberal market economy. In line with this work, I assume that both countries are interested in the
maintenance of their respective regime type. This implies that national governments perceive costs and bene-
¯ts of a single pensions market di®erently, depending on the magnitude of changes they have to make to their
distinctive welfare-¯nance arrangements. According to the VOC literature, coordinated market economies
are characterized by long-term relations between ¯rm and workers, access to patient capital, generous bio-
metric risk coverage, and a society lacking an equity culture. Long vesting periods reward loyal employees
but punish frequent job changers, especially women who interrupt their careers for child-rearing or other
family duties. Because the goals of the single pensions market (more e±cient management of occupational
pensions across borders, deeper capital market integration, and labor mobility) seem diametrically opposed
to the coordinated market model, I expect governments representing this group of states to oppose the single
pensions market.
Conversely, governments representing liberal market economies should embrace the Commission proposal,
17because the goals corresponded to their comparative institutional advantage. The general discourse in these
countries largely re°ects citizens' acceptance that statutory pensions will not provide for old age. Because the
basic pension is low and ungenerous, occupational pension schemes are well established and characterized by
substantial funding and signi¯cant voluntary provision, both of which are facilitated by °exible investment
rules (Bodie and Mitchell 1996; Davis 2000; Lynes 1997). Key features of asset managers in liberal market
economies are a strong international orientation and speci¯c expertise in equity investment. In contrast to
CMEs, biometric risk coverage is rarely o®ered.
Given the signi¯cant consequences of social policy and investment choices for the future operation of the
single pension market, I expect to ¯nd strong disagreements both among and within countries over its regu-
latory design. The basic problem is the tradeo® each government faces between creating the collective good
of a single pensions market and maintaining its own supervisory, investment, and social regulations. O±cial
communications, position statements, and minutes issued by various European institutions18 indicate that
the politically most contested issues revolved around 1) investment regulations, 2) biometric risk coverage,
and 3) unfunded book reserve pensions. The subsequent section explores the factors that in°uence the sen-
sitivity of governments and pension institutions to these tradeo®s.
5.1 Investment rules
Cross-national variation in investment regulations essentially mirrors the tradeo® between a high risk/ high
return strategy and a low risk/ low return approach. British and Dutch funds, for example, are free to invest
more than 5 percent of the fund in any sponsoring company. German funds, however, have to meet no fewer
than six separate limits: they cannot invest more than 30 percent in EU equities; not more than 25 percent
in EU property; not more than 6 percent in non-EU equity; not more than 6 percent in non-EU bonds; and
not more than 20 percent in overall foreign assets. In Denmark and Austria, pension funds may invest up to
40 percent of the funds they manage in equities; in France the limit is 25 percent (Deutsch 2002). A survey
by aba, the German Occupational Pension Association, shows that many member states still discriminate
against foreign investment funds. Together with onerous administrative requirements, such as registration
obligations, this constitutes a major obstacle to a single pensions market (see aba-online.de).
Restrictive investment regulations are generally a re°ection of a risk-averse society that lacks an equity
18culture. They are routinely justi¯ed on the grounds that investors need protection against market risk, al-
though the e®ectiveness of quantitative investment limits for reducing risk has been contested in the literature
(NÄ urk and Schrader 1995). In Germany, such a risk-averse attitude is especially pronounced where pension
providers are subject to codetermination. Joint control over pension assets essentially a®ects the composition
of a company's executive board and implies that the investment behavior re°ects the attitude of the insured.
This is mirrored in the small proportion of shares in the monetary assets of German households. Thus,
pension funds and their managers generally prefer steady pro¯t development. Irregular developments would
result in an irregular distribution of pro¯ts to the insured over time and is perceived as unfair (Deutsch 2002).
The British ¯nancial system, by contrast, imposes a relatively short-term horizon on companies, but at the
same time allows high risk taking. Flexible investment rules ¯t with the comparative institutional advantage
Britain enjoys in the areas of investment services, asset management, and ¯nancial product innovation. Such
investment rules facilitate the substantial funding of pensions and the development of the pension industry
as one of the largest in the world. Key features of the international expertise of British asset managers are a
strong international orientation and speci¯c expertise in equity investment (Bodie and Mitchell 1996; Davis
1999). As a result of the unique development of British ¯nancial system and the ungenerous ¯rst pillar
pension, the pension industry is more mature than most of the continental counterparts. Because the City of
London had a clear competitive advantage in the business of pension management vis--vis ¯nancial centers in
conservative pension cultures, it stood to gain most from the liberalization of investment regulations (Talani
2000).
5.2 Biometric risk coverage and book reserve pensions
The second controversial issue surrounding the pension fund directive concerned the extent of biometric risk
coverage, including protection against longevity, invalidity, and survivor insurance. The percentage of the
population that has access to biometric risk bene¯ts varies considerably across countries, and within the
same country, across di®erent pension schemes. While German pension plans routinely o®er biometric risk
coverage, British plan sponsors o®er this coverage to a very limited extent, or not at all. What are the insti-
tutional bene¯ts for ¯rms to provide relatively expensive social risk protection? Swenson's (2002) research
has demonstrated that the design of corporate bene¯ts a®ects not only the labor market strategies of ¯rms,
but also the nature of competition in product markets (Swenson 2002). If ¯rms want to engage in radical
19innovation, they have to have easy access to risk-willing capital, they must be able to °exibly hire and ¯re
workers on the external market, and they must be able to easily reorganize work (Hall and Soskice 2001).
In Britain, social policies enter the utility of employers with a negative sign because they do not ¯t with the
high return/ high risk strategy British companies pursue. Biometric risk coverage raises the labor costs of
companies, decreasing overall pro¯tability. Other economic analyses have pointed to social insurance as an
impediment on the ability of ¯rms to deploy their labor market resources °exibly and, thus, as a source of
\welfare losses" for the ¯rm. The limited supply of biometric risk insurance demonstrates that the costs of
social policies usually outweigh the bene¯ts of social policies to British employers.
In contrast to this, ¯rms pursuing incremental innovation strategies need access to \patient" capital, a work-
force with industry-speci¯c skills, which in turn requires long-term relations between ¯rm and workers, and
a wage-setting system that prevents poaching of skilled workers by competing ¯rms (Hall and Soskice 2001).
Book reserve pensions constitute an important part of this type of capitalism. The reason for their popularity
is that they provide companies with a cheap source of patient capital, independent of current pro¯tability,
while at the same time rewarding loyal core workers. Because such pensions belong to employees only after
unusually long waiting and vesting periods, they provide an e®ective mechanism against poaching. Scholars
of the German welfare state have demonstrated that important segments of the business community have
on numerous occasions supported institutions of biometric risk coverage (Mares 2003).
5.3 Representation of preferences
The nature of welfare-¯nance arrangements in coordinated and liberal market economies allows us to map
the preferences of conservative and liberal member states over this policy tradeo® in a two-dimensional policy
space.
20Biometric risk coverage
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Given the signi¯cant consequences of social policy and investment choices for the future operation of a sin-
gle pensions market, one expects to encounter strong con°ict and disagreement among di®erent countries
over these details at EU level negotiations. This is based on the implicit assumption in the VOC literature
that representatives of both conservative and liberal states have an interest in maintaining their respective
regulatory systems. Therefore, one should expect both governments to push for policies favorable to their
distinctive capitalism type. These considerations allow us to determine countries' ideal points regarding a
European pension directive in the spatial model.
Germany's ideal point lies in the upper right corner of the \high biometric risk coverage/ high investment
restriction" policy space. Such an outcome would compel the European ¯nancial industry to abide by re-
strictive investment rules and force them to o®er a certain set of expensive pension products. Although the
formal agreement on EU level cooperation of the supervisory authorities would have made cross-border pen-
sion activity legally possible, de facto it would have done little more than perpetuate the status quo. Most
¯rms would have abstained from setting up pension schemes in other countries, because the costs of lacking
a single pension market would have been merely replaced by the costs of navigating an overly restrictive one.
The British ideal point lies diametrically opposed to Germany's, in the lower left corner of the \low biometric
risk coverage/ low investment restriction" policy space. This outcome would create the most °exible regula-
tory framework and therefore the most cross-border activity. The European ¯nancial industry would follow
21the relatively liberal prudent man rule and o®er only minimal amounts of biometric risk coverage, enticing
many ¯rms to join the lucrative pensions market and o®er services in other countries. Because companies
could manage all of their employees' pension entitlements in a single country, real savings in administrative
costs would materialize. This version emphasizes the ¯nancial aspects of the single pension market and tones
down the social concerns.
The status quo is represented on the high end of the vertical axis and signi¯es the absence of a European
regulatory framework. The shaded area is the intersection of conservative and liberal indi®erence curves and
represents the set of all outcomes that are Pareto-superior to the status quo. Thus, moving from outside the
status quo inside the lens always leads to an improvement. The preferences of the two types on the issues of
investment rules and biometric risk coverage are summarized by indi®erence contours centered about each
one's respective ideal point.
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Note that the indi®erence curves are not presented as concentric circles, but ellipses. This means that, if a
country moves away from its ideal point, the direction matters. This re°ects the assumption about countries'
preference intensity. The preceding sections suggest that Germany felt more intensely about the issue of
biometric risk coverage than investment rules, while the UK felt more strongly about investment rules than
biometric risk coverage.
What factors a®ect the sensitivity of governments to biometric risk coverage? As mentioned earlier, im-
portant factors that in°uence the sign of the utility along these dimensions are countries' welfare-¯nance
22arrangements. Empirical measures of the welfare-¯nance nexus include the size and generosity of ¯rst pillar
statutory pensions, the strength of second pillar occupational pensions, and their di®erent ¯nance arrange-
ments. The generosity of statutory pensions in conservative countries, the underdevelopment of externally
funded pension schemes, and the importance of social policies for the employment practices of ¯rms indicate
that German negotiators should exhibit a strong preference for the inclusion of mandatory biometric risk
coverage into the pension fund directive. Given the small size of statutory pensions in liberal states, the
maturity of its second pillar pension system, and the fact that social policies do not play an important role
in employment strategies of companies, we expect only a weak preference over biometric risk coverage.
What factors a®ect the sensitivity of governments to investment rules? Germany shows a pattern for risk
averseness, the lack of an equity culture, and a preference for quantitative investment restrictions. However,
since the majority of occupational pensions are provided in the form of book reserves and externally man-
aged pension funds (Pensionskasse, support funds, and pension funds) play only a minor role in Germany,
we expect only a weak preference over investment rules. By contrast, the long experience and international
expertise of UK fund managers and consultants suggests that the British ¯nancial industry would gain dis-
proportionally from a single pensions market. This implies that, for Britain, any move away from the status
quo into the shaded area would be an improvement.
The contract curve in ¯gures 2 and 3 represents all Pareto-optimal outcomes, where no side can deviate
from its position without making the other side worse o®. Due to the elliptical shape of the countries' in-
di®erence curves, the contract curve is actually a curve, instead of a straight line. Pareto-optimal outcomes
on the contract curve include the two countries' ideal points as well as the universe of possible negotiated
policy compromises between the two. The following section examines the level of integration { or point on
the contract curve { that was chosen when the member states eventually agreed on the 2003 pension fund
directive, and analyze the extent to which the liberal states accommodated their conservative counterparts
after credible signaling took place.
5.4 The 2003 Pension Fund Directive: who wins and who loses
This section illustrates the ways in which the liberal states { although initially reluctant to compromise
{ departed from their ideal points to accommodate the preferences of the conservative states. To under-
23stand how EU decisions translate into domestic policies, we use Schmidt's (2002) analytical framework, who
distinguishes between di®erent EU adjustment pressures (decisions accompanied by more or less highly spec-
i¯ed rules for compliance, suggested rules, or no rules) and potential adjustment mechanisms (coercion to a
greater or lesser degree, mimesis, or regulatory competition) to predict how EU regulations a®ect national
policies (inertia, absorption, or transformation) (Schmidt 2002).
Applied to the pension fund directive, the member states agreed on coercion in the area of investment rules;
on the principle of home country control regarding quantitative investment limits and provision of biometric
risk coverage; and on the exclusion of certain occupational pension schemes from the purview of the directive.
Pension institutions will be able to select investment managers established anywhere in the EU. They will
also need to comply with the newly established supervisory authorities in Brussels, Frankfurt, and Paris.
Thus, the result is a pension fund directive that strikes a careful balance between coercion, mimesis, and
regulatory competition.
Article 18 (5) represents a sacri¯ce on part of the liberal states by allowing member states to \lay down more
detailed rules, including quantitative rules", as long as they don't prevent institutions from investing 70 per-
cent of assets in equity, 30 percent of assets in foreign currency, and investing in risk capital markets.19 The
liberal states were initially opposed to this stipulation, because it provides pension funds in liberal countries
with a disincentive to gain a foothold in those countries. The conservative member states insisted on its
inclusion to make clear to their domestic constituents that they were protecting bene¯ciaries against market
risk. The general risk averseness and lack of an equity culture in conservative member states demanded
nothing less. \Now they can at least protect their own nationals against unsound investments." (Interview
with EU Commission administrators, 21 June 2006 and 23 June 2006). Although the liberal states conceded
the article on quantitative investment limits to grant their conservative counterparts a \safety net", the
overall investment policy put forward by the directive indicates the liberalization of investment rules. In
the spatial representation, this agreement denotes a point on the contract curve that is closer to the liberal
states' ideal point.
However, paragraph 5 quali¯es this ostensible victory for the liberal states by specifying that member states
may apply more stringent investment rules in their respective home countries as long as they are pruden-
tially justi¯ed.20 By using the formulation \prudentially justi¯ed', this paragraph accommodates all member
24states uncomfortable with the prudent man rule, which they perceive as too relaxed. \Since it is unclear
even to Commission members involved in drafting the directive text what prudentially justi¯ed really means,
it was relatively easy to agree on it." (Interview with Commission administrator, 21 June 2006).21
While coercion was limited to investment regulations, the social aspects of the directive were de¯ned by
the principle of home country control. This is because the divergent welfare-¯nance arrangements in the
member states militated against a one-size-¯ts-all solution. Although a majority of MEPs originally wanted
to force pension institutions to o®er biometric risk coverage if desired by employers or employees, the Council
opposed any framework that would compel pension institutions to o®er a certain product. Council repre-
sentatives reasoned that, aside from restricting competition, this provision would also violate the principle
of subsidiarity (Karas 2003).
Yet, where insurance against biometrical risks are provided, the directive requires pension institutions to
have su±cient provisions to cover these bene¯ts.22 Such pension schemes engaged in cross-border activity are
also required to be fully funded at all times. This means that the conservative states were able to maintain
their ideal point on biometric risk coverage. At the same time, the principle of home country control allowed
the liberal states to retain their ideal point position on the same policy dimension, thus re°ecting a Pareto
improvement for both types of states.
Finally, the inclusion of article 2, section 2 (e) was very important to all conservative states where book
reserve pensions play a prominent role. Germany in particular insisted on removing unfunded book reserve
pensions from the purview of the directive. This is because book reserve pensions would directly con°ict
with article 18 (e) (\assets shall be properly diversi¯ed"). Although the liberal states countered that an
exemption for book reserve pensions would give an unfair advantage to employers using them to ¯nance
current business activities, it soon became clear that no compromise would be reached if employers were
forced to surrender their cherished source of cheap capital and means for sta® retention (Interview with EU
administrator, 21 June, 2006). The conservative states were able to credible signal that such far-reaching
regulatory change would never be accepted by their domestic constituents. Consequently, only funded pen-
sion schemes will be subject to the de¯nition of \institutions for occupational retirement provision", while
on-balance sheet pensions are exempt from the directive. This was acceptable to the conservative states
since externally funded pension schemes play only a minor role compared to book reserve pensions.
25The conservative states, on the other hand, reluctantly agreed to article 16, section 2, which speci¯es that
member states may allow institutions \for a limited period of time, to have insu±cient assets to cover
the technical provisions." This provision clearly re°ects the position of the powerful British pension funds,
trumping the concerns of the European insurance industry (Interview with EU Commission administrator,
23 June 2006).
5.5 Signi¯cance of the 2003 compromise
The nature of the compromise the European member states reached in 2003 regarding the contested issue
areas of investment regulations, biometric risk coverage, and book reserve pensions reveals two things: the
liberal states sacri¯ced more than their conservative counterparts, and the conservative states made conces-
sions in areas they cared only marginally about. Although the overall regulatory approach to investment
regulations was indeed \coercion", the restrictions recorded in article 18(5) and paragraph 5 considerably
softened the pain of liberalizing investment regulations for the conservative states. Furthermore, by agreeing
on the principle of home country control regarding biometric risk coverage and permitting the exclusion of
book reserve pensions from the purview of the directive, the liberal states allowed the conservative countries
to maintain their ideal points in two crucial policy areas. This outcome supports our hypothesis that the
2003 directive is the result of credible signaling on part of the conservative states, while preferences over the
design of the single pension market remained unchanged between 1991 and 2003.
Although the IORP directive constitutes a ¯rst step towards a single pension market, it is unlikely that
there will be an upsurge in cross-border pension portability anytime soon. It remains to be seen whether
individual member states will use the principle of home country control to increase or inhibit cross-border
pension transfers. Furthermore, sensitive issue areas such as taxation of transferred pension claims have yet
to be sorted out before we can speak of a truly integrated pension market. Nonetheless, given the manifold
political and economic obstacles to integration, the 2003 compromise must be considered a bargaining success.
266 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by the question of how the European member states with their divergent welfare-
¯nance regimes negotiate solutions to the problem of governing pension funds across borders. Even though
governments in both conservative and liberal market economies stood to gain from integration in this sector,
they could not reach an agreement when the EU Commission ¯rst drafted a pension fund directive in 1991.
In 2003, however, the amended directive was passed by the Council of Ministers.
The central argument is that the success of EU harmonization e®orts in the occupational pension sector de-
pends on the ability of governments to credibly signal that their domestic win set is indeed constrained. We
demonstrated that signals sent by conservative governments in a nontransparent, pre-EMU setting were less
credible than signals sent in a transparent, post-EMU environment. Furthermore, this paper shows that the
liberal states, although more enthusiastic about a single pension market, would not create it at all costs. In
1991, failure to distinguish between sincere conservative governments confronted with high adjustment costs
and deceitful \low cost" governments trying to mimic the high cost type lead to negotiation breakdown. Eu-
ropean Monetary Union, however, increased the costs of bargaining failure for the conservative governments.
In this environment, requests for accommodation at the EU level were interpreted by the liberal states as
costly and could be met with an honest, separating response. As a result, the EU member states adopted a
pension fund directive authorizing high harmonization of investment regulations, low harmonization of fund-
ing requirements, and no harmonization of biometric risk coverage. Although skeptics have rightly criticized
the directive as a de¯cient legislative bricolage, the fact that ¯fteen member states with radically di®erent
occupational pension systems were able to develop and adopt a pension fund directive makes it a negotiation
success.
We do not, however, pretend that the model presented here is an accurate or exhaustive depiction of delib-
erations between member state representatives. The purpose of the signaling game is to provide a baseline
model highlighting the role of information and informal signaling between the member states, an often over-
looked aspect in the literature that has predominantly focused on formal decision-making processes. Scholars
working on formal procedures may be guided by the baseline model, because it is important to understand
the structure underlying information °ows and the mechanisms that make signaling possible.
[word count: 10,734]
27Appendix
Equilibrium Characterization
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of the players' optimal actions, given the other players' equilibrium
actions and beliefs about types. To simplify construction of the equilibrium, assume CH has a dominant
strategy of always o®ering x = 0.
Let x¤ be the o®er for which L is indi®erent between accepting and rejecting, i.e. x¤ satis¯es
¡(1 ¡ x) + IL ¸ 0 ) x¤ = 1 ¡ IL:
Next, we de¯ne o®{equilibrium path beliefs. For any x 2 (0;1], let L believe it faces CL, i.e. it sets its
posterior belief to ¹ = 1. This assumption has intuitive appeal, since CH has a dominant strategy of always
o®ering x = 0, and thus not stands to gain from deviating to x > 0.
With these o®-equilibrium path beliefs (and with beliefs on the equilibrium path obtained by Bayesian
updating), optimal strategies in a mixing equilibrium (corresponding to BREAKDOWN) are given by the
probability that CL o®ers x0 = 0,
p =
(¼ ¡ 1)(IL + k ¡ 1)
¼(IL ¡ 1)
;
where ¼ is L's prior belief about C's type, and the probability that L rejects an o®er x0,
q =
x¤
IC =
1 ¡ IL
IC ;
such that (existence conditions)
k >
IL ¡ 1
¼ ¡ 1
and IL + IC > 1:
Proof of existence (omitted) follows directly from the construction of the equilibrium.
How do changes in the valuation of agreement a®ect the probability of bargaining breakdown?
The probability of bargaining breakdown is given by
q ((1 ¡ ¼) + ¼p):
28Substituting in for q and p, and taking the ¯rst derivative with respect to IC gives
¡x¤
µ
1 ¡ ¼ +
(¼ ¡ 1)(IL + k ¡ 1)
IL ¡ 1
¶
· 0:
In order to ensure that higher valuations of agreement lead to a lower probability of bargaining breakdown,
this expression must be less or equal to 0. Rearranging and simplifying gives
(¼ ¡ 1)k
IL ¡ 1
> 0:
Since ¼;IL < 1, this condition is always met.
29Notes
1Callaghan and HÄ opner (2005) ask the same question in their article on takeover liberalization in the EU.
2(European Parliament/ Council Directive 2003/41/EC of 3 June 2003) The deadline for transposing the directive was 23
September 2005.
3Throughout the text, we use the terms corporate pensions, occupational pensions, employer sponsored pensions, and second
pillar pensions interchangeably. Such pensions can take on a variety of institutional forms. Some pension claims are externally
managed by insurance companies or trust funds, others only exist on the books and are not funded. Some corporate pensions
are exclusively controlled by the sponsoring ¯rm, others are jointly managed by employer and labor unions. The criterion that
distinguishes occupational pensions from state sponsored or private pension schemes is that they are provided by individual
employers or sectoral umbrella organizations.
4The terms liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) were coined by Hall and Soskice
(2001).
5Such pensions are also referred to as on-balance sheet pensions. In Germany, where unfunded book reserve pensions make
up two thirds of all occupational pensions, the solvency of any not fully funded pension scheme has to be guaranteed by
membership in the solvency insurance scheme Pensionssicherungsverein (PSV a.G.)
6The waiting period is the elapsed time before an employee earns the right to a corporate pension claim. The vesting period
denotes the time from acquiring corporate pension contributions until the bene¯ts are actually owned by the employee.
7There is no consensus in the literature on whether book reserve pensions or funded pensions are the safer option. See
Jacobs (2004) for an overview of this discussion.
8British pension schemes account for 42 percent of all EU pension assets, and the Danish and Dutch schemes add another
26 percent on top of that. See International and Social Security Association (ISSA) and International Network of Pension
Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS), 2002: complementary and private pensions database. CD-ROM.
9SEC (91) 1332 ¯nal, OJ C 312, 3.12.1991. This proposal was withdrawn in 1994.
10This countero®er included the maintenance of quantitative investment restrictions, compulsory biometric risk coverage, and
the limitation of the directive to o®-balance sheet pensions.
11The Financial Times, April 15, 2002.
12According to Standard and Poor's rating of March 31, 2006, Belgium is currently rated AA+, Italy AA-, and Portugal
AA-. Spain only recently received the highest rating, AAA. See http://www.standardandpoors.com.
13The ¯rm was downgraded from BBB to BB+ (Financial Times, August 8, 2006)
14Each member state, on taking up the presidency, has tended to give emphasis to the directives that most closely a®ect its
own nationals.
15The formal model may be criticized for not including the role of the Council president or EU Commission as information
transmitters and honest brokers who mediate between the member states (Sbragia 1993; Sbragia 2002). Several empirical
analyses of various EU negotiations have detailed how the EU presidency can isolate or form alliances with certain member
states to unlock incompatible negotiating positions (Bjurulf and ElgstrÄ om 2004; Stubb 2002; Tallberg 2004). While we do not
wish to challenge these important contributions, we assume for the sake of this paper that the Commission or Council president
did not have privileged access to information in this game. Without this assumption, we would not be able to explain bargaining
failure in 1991. The reason is that, with superior knowledge of member states' true reform costs, presumably the Commission
30would not have put forward the 1991 proposal in the ¯rst place. Instead, we portray the Commission and Council presidency
as a focal point (Schelling 1960) around which member states cooperated after credible signaling took place.
16See appendix. For an overview of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, see for example, (Gibbons 1992) or (Ordeshook 1986).
17This is documented in the European Parliamentary Debates (1999-2004) and in the minutes of the European Parliamentary
Financial Services Forum (2000-2004).
18(European Council 1999{2004; European Parliament 1999{2004; European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum 1999{
2004)
19Directive 2003/41/EC, article 18 (5)
20\Paragraph 5 shall not preclude the right for member states to require the application to institutions located in their
territory of more stringent investment rules also on an individual basis provided they are prudentially justi¯ed, in particular in
the light of the liabilities entered into by the institution." (Directive 2003/41/EC, paragraph 5).
21Eventually, the European Court of Justice will have to interpret the precise meaning of vague stipulations, thereby creating
policy. Yet it is not clear why the member states would ever delegate policy making to the ECJ. Because a satisfactory answer
to this question would go beyond the scope of this paper, it is not addressed here.
22Directive 2003/41/EC, paragraph 30; article 15 (2); and article 17 (1)
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